What’s new this time isn’t the demonstrable appetite of Russian society to defend itself. It’s the evident inability of the government to conduct a rational cost-benefit analysis. If there is not a quick re-think, the political and economic costs of this endeavor could quickly exceed the government’s ability to pay.
All that said, the trigger points that will turn all of this evolution into revolution don’t exist.
For one thing, there’s still no real indication that anything like a critical mass of Russian citizens thinks things would be appreciably better under a Navalny presidency. Distaste for ‘Dimon’ is popular, and the ‘Nadoel’ meme is powerful – but there are a lot of things of which Russians are sick and tired, and precious few of them ever seem to go away, no matter who is in charge.
If Putin is in fact driven out by the street (and, while possible, that is not the likeliest of scenarios), it will not be because his citizens have discovered a new savior, but because they have – suddenly and unexpectedly – lost faith in the old one.
That prospect should focus the Kremlin’s mind on one critical question: how to fight back. Initial indications are that the government is leaning towards more coercion, rather than less.
If the Kremlin was content to let the 2011 protests run their course until crackdowns in May 6, 2012, it seems to have no such patience this time around. Many of those arrested in March and last weekend can expect to see real jail time. And as the chemical warfare against Navalny and others suggests, extra-legal measures are also very much in play — in a way they never were six years ago.
Going hard against the opposition might deter protesters and get Russians off the streets, but the history of high-risk activism around the world teaches a different lesson.
Yes, increasing risks does help keep people at home when movements are new and solidarity is still weak. But when the battle lines have long been drawn – as they have in Russia – escalation by the state tends to lead to greater commitment and an increased sense of ‘now-or-never’ urgency.
That may not be the Kremlin’s desired result.
Samuel A. Greene is Director of the Russia Institute at King’s College London and author of Moscow in Movement: Power and Opposition in Putin’s Russia.