This month, the U.S. said yet more sanctions would be imposed on Russia, this time over its use in the UK of a banned nerve agent against Sergey Skripal, a former double agent. U.S. policy toward Russia makes liberal use of sanctions. An earlier analysis of the effectiveness of sanctions levied in the past by various nations has shown mixed results. Perhaps it is worth asking the further question of whether sanctions on Russians are most effective when targeted on individuals and entities responsible for malign activities, but less so when not.
In the 1980s U.S. policy toward the Soviet war in Afghanistan showed that symmetrical, targeted measures may be more effective. At first, President Carter responded by enforcing a U.S. boycott of the 1980 summer Olympics in Moscow and banning exports to the USSR of U.S. grain and information technology. These measures had an ephemeral effect. The Olympics went ahead despite boycotts from many countries, and President Reagan lifted the grain export ban.
A more potent U.S. response was symmetrical and targeted, the provision of military aid to Afghan guerillas, including Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. This aid, and the emergence of Mikhail Gorbachev who sought to curb the Soviet military and improve Western ties, helped induce the USSR in 1989 to withdraw forces from Afghanistan.
Similarly, NATO has responded symmetrically to Russian aggression in Ukraine. The alliance rotates U.S., British, Canadian, and German combat forces through Poland and the Baltics, and has boosted its presence in the Black Sea region. Allies in NATO’s eastern flank would have viewed a sanctions-only response as too weak and of uncertain effect.
